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Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A
Survey of Possible Exit Strategies
Donald A. Dripps*
In both the constitutional law of American criminal justice and the
scholarly literature that law has generated, substance and procedure
receive radically different treatment. The Supreme Court, even in this
conservative political period, continues to require costly procedural
safeguards that go beyond what elected legislatures have provided by
statute.' The Court, however, has shown great deference to the choices
these same legislatures make about what conduct may be made criminal
and how severely it may be punished.2
The distinction between substance and procedure pervades
academic thinking all the way down to the foundations. Substantive
criminal law still holds its place in the sacred precincts of the first year
curriculum. Criminal Law's cognate discipline is philosophy; the
standard method of analysis is to measure general principles according to

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School.
1. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that Sixth
Amendment's confrontation clause prohibits prosecution use of accusatory out of court
statements by declarants who are not subject to cross-examination by the defense either at
or before trial; dying declarations excepted); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires jury determination of
facts that trigger increases in sentence authorized by guidelines within statutory
maximum for offense of conviction).
2. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment
challenge to twenty-five years to life sentence under recidivism statute, when offense of
conviction was theft of three golf clubs valued at $399 each); Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
statutory rape law applicable solely to males); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence of life without parole for
private consensual sale of less than one kilogram of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence of two
consecutive twenty year terms for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of
marijuana); Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) (rejecting
substantive due process challenge to state law criminalizing sale of narcotics); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to conviction of
compulsive alcoholic for offense of public intoxication).
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how well they track intuition's response to hypothetical cases. 3 Criminal
Procedure's cognate discipline is Constitutional Law; the standard
method of analysis is to subject the operation of the criminal justice
system to the same rhetoric of text, history, and precedent that frames the
issues in separation of powers or freedom of speech cases.4 The
philosophy mediated by doctrine is political, rather than moral theory.
In trial-level courthouses, however, the distinction fades, as the
defendant trades his procedural rights for reductions in his substantive
liability. The substantive law endows the prosecution with the ability to
charge the same conduct at many different levels of potential
punishment. The procedural law also endows the defense with its stock
in trade-the rights to suppression motions, discovery, elaborate jury
selection procedures, confrontation of the victim, and so on.
These endowments are dynamic rather than static. A legislature that
adopts a three-strikes law increases the prosecution's bargaining power.
A court that reads the confrontation clause to bar excited utterances from
the government's proof increases the defendant's bargaining power. In
the trenches of criminal justice, these entitlements may well be traded
off, erasing the distinction between substance and process.
For example, a defendant might plead guilty in exchange for the
prosecution's agreement to drop the recidivism charge, a deal the
government would not have taken but for the risk of acquittal posed by
the exclusion of the victim's 911 call. In such cases, the Court's
judgment about fair procedure has turned into a trump on the
legislature's judgment about the appropriate sentence; and the
legislature's sentencing determination has served to circumvent the
Court's procedural ruling. The theoretical distinction has collapsed in
practice.
The procedural law, moreover, imposes only negligible restraints on
the choices of the parties. Absent clear evidence of invidious motive that
is hard to prove even when it exists, the prosecutor's charging discretion
is plenary.5 The two procedural entitlements the defendant is legally
3.

For a representative sample of recent work, see, e.g., Larry Alexander,

Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REv. 931

(2000); Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishmentfor 'CulpableIndifference' Simply Punish
for 'Bad Character'?Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus
Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219 (2002); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and
CriminalResponsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363.

4.

For illustrative recent work, see, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case's New

Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 395; Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment

Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (2002);
George C. Thomas III, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
543.

5. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that
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precluded from waiving for personal advantage are competence to stand
trial 6 and awareness of the risks and benefits of the trade-off he is making
when pleading guilty. 7 He may plead guilty even though he maintains
his innocence 8 and even though he does so to avoid being killed by the
state. 9
Admirable scholarship has exposed this basic dynamic.' ° Debate
evidence that U.S. Attorney's office had prosecuted no Caucasians for cocaine offenses
did not overcome presumption of prosecutorial propriety; facts alleged insufficient to

justify district court's discovery order).
6. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (holding that when evidence raises
bona fide question of defendant's competence, trial court has constitutional obligation to
hold hearing to determine competence).
7. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that defendant need
be informed of impeachment evidence disclosable before trial under Brady doctrine
before entering voluntary guilty plea) ("Given the seriousness of the matter, the
Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is
'voluntary' and that the defendant must make related waivers 'knowing[ly],
intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."') (citation omitted).
8. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
9. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) ("[A] plea of guilty is not
invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.") (footnote
omitted).
10. The possibility that legislatures might make trade-offs between substance and
procedure was noted by the Supreme Court in Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 20708 (1977), and before that in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970):
Since this [court-mandated hearing] process [before revoking welfare benefits]
will usually entail a delay of several years, the inevitable result of such a
constitutionally imposed burden will be that the government will not put a
claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaustive investigation to
determine his eligibility. While this Court will perhaps have insured that no
needy person will be taken off the rolls without a full 'due process' proceeding,
it will also have insured that many will never get on the rolls, or at least that

they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine
initial eligibility.
Id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).
The seminal contribution identifying substance/procedure tradeoffs at the
adjudicatory level via plea bargaining is Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983). Professor Stuntz has done the most to
expose how the substance/procedure tradeoff undermines the Supreme Court's project of
regulating criminal procedure, but not the substantive criminal law, as a field of
constitutional law. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between CriminalProcedureand CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. I (1997);
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505
(2001).

Due largely to Stuntz' work, the substance/procedure feedback loop now pervades a
great deal of scholarly commentary. For example, commentators with quite different
views of the merits have evaluated the Apprendi doctrine based on its perceived tendency
to increase or decrease prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining. See Stephanos Bibas,
JudicialFact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE
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continues about two great issues. First, is this state of affairs normatively
defensible or not? Second, if the present relationship between substance
and procedure is undesirable, what, if anything, can be done about it? I'
The first question has drawn more attention, and I have little to add
to that literature other than to record my general sympathy with plea
bargaining's critics. The very features of the system that provoke
widespread criticism are rather obvious; the system persists, I think,
because of the difficulties attending the plausible alternatives. What
seems inescapable is that the balance of advantage between the parties
bears only an arbitrary relationship to the ends of justice. Albert
Alschuler articulates a variety of objections to plea bargaining, but he
captures the fundamental one in a single sentence: "Plea bargaining
makes a substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what
he did or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical
decision
12
irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings."'
The cost of the defendant's procedural rights does not vary directly
with the probabilities of guilt and innocence. One major cost of trial to
prosecutors is the risk of acquittal. Procedural rights that benefit the
innocent more than the guilty thus make the trials of defendants with
strong cases more costly than trial of those with weak cases, other things
equal. But many procedural rights are more valuable to the guilty than
the innocent (suppression motions, the privilege against selfincrimination) and others (speedy trial, demographically representative
jury selection) seem to operate without regard to guilt or innocence.
The risk of error is only one cost of trial for the government. The
resources devoted to trial are another. There does not seem to be any
reason to believe that trying innocent defendants is less costly than trying
L.J. 1097 (2001) (arguing, inter alia, that invalidating judicial fact-finding at sentencing
will hurt defendants and reinforce prosecutors); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REv. 295 (2001) (contesting the Bibas
thesis). The facial question in Apprendi cases-whether trial jurors or sentencing judges
better serve constitutional goals such as checking government power and accurately
finding the facts-seems almost beside the point.
11. The two questions are of course connected. For a sample of views, see PBS
Frontline: the plea, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews

(June 17, 2004) (excerpting interviews on plea bargaining with various experts including
Albert Alschuler, John Langbein, and Stephen Schulhofer); Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463 (2004) [hereinafter
Bibas, Outside the Shadow]; Stuntz, DisappearingShadow, supra note 10; Robert Scott
& William Stuntz, Plea Bargain as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Disaster]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE
L.J. 1969 (1992).
12. Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 932 (1983)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Alternatives] (footnote omitted).
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guilty ones. One of the primary determinants of the government's
expected resource cost is the resources available to the defense, a factor
that tracks the defendant's socioeconomic status rather than the evidence
against him.
If the system is doing justice now it is by accident-the accident
that particular prosecutors bargain prudently and humanely. There are
13
good reasons to doubt that this happy accident is really taking place.
And even if executive discretion produces now something tolerably close
to justice, the grotesque concentration of power in so few hands conflicts
directly with the rule of law.
The system we have is far too close to
14
comfort.
for
justice"
"kadi
Objectionable as a judicial tribunal proceeding from case to case on
an entirely ad hoc basis may be, the actual practice of plea bargaining
poses a still worse separation-of-powers problem. For if the prosecutor
dominates plea bargaining, and plea bargaining simply is the criminal
justice process, the real trial is the one, quite informal and necessarily
based mostly on hearsay, at which the prosecutor decides what charges to
file and what plea to accept.1 5 At least the kadi is a judge; an assistant
13. One reason is the lesson of history; arbitrary power is rarely exercised benignly.
Another reason is experience; evidence is coming to light to confirm the supposition that
the pressures brought to bear on the accused are powerful enough to induce factually
innocent persons to plead guilty in significant numbers:
Only 19 of the exonerees in our database pled guilty, less than 6% of the total:
15 innocent murder defendants and 4 innocent rape defendants who took deals
that included long prison terms in order to avoid the risk of life imprisonment
or the death penalty. By contrast, 31 of the 39 Tulia defendants pled guilty to
drug offenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the 100 or more
exonerated defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles. Most of the
Rampart and Tulia defendants had been released by the time they were
exonerated, 2 to 4 years after conviction. They were exonerated because the
false convictions in their cases were produced by systematic programs of police
perjury that were uncovered as part of large scale investigations. If these same
defendants had been falsely convicted of the same crimes by mistake-or even
because of unsystematic acts of deliberate dishonesty-we would never have
known.
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989-2003, at
http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Prison-Exonerations-Gross 19aprO4.htm
(Apr.
19, 2001) (footnote omitted).
14. Cf.Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency.").
15. Judge Lynch, who has extensive first-hand knowledge of the federal practice,
frankly describes plea bargaining in these terms:
Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily discussions of the merits of the
case, in which defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary, or practical
weaknesses in the prosecutor's case, or mitigating circumstances that merit
mercy, and argue based on these considerations that the defendant is entitled to
a more lenient disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor's
charge. The literature of negotiation suggests, indeed, that most sophisticated
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U.S. attorney, or an assistant state's attorney, is an agent of the very
executive the trial is supposed to protect the citizen against.
In this paper I take up the second question, which seems to me to
have drawn too little systematic attention (perhaps because it is so
daunting). The literature has devoted considerable debate to alternatives
to plea bargaining.1 6 But these discussions have been self-contained;
they do not take account of the substance/procedure feedback loop
already in place. The principal point against proposals to ban bargaining
is not that we should not but that we cannot; self-interested, repeatplaying actors in the criminal justice process will find ways to bargain.
The debate, naturally enough, has not gotten to the point of "what if we
succeeded in banning plea bargaining?"

negotiation takes this form. To me, the essence of this practice, and what
radically distinguishes it from the adversarial litigation model embodied in
textbooks, criminal procedure rules, and the popular imagination, is that the
prosecutor, rather than a judge or jury, is the central adjudicator of facts (as
well as replacing the judge as arbiter of most legal issues and of the appropriate
sentence to be imposed). Potential defenses are presented by the defendant and
his counsel not in a court, but to a prosecutor, who assesses their factual
accuracy and likely persuasiveness to a hypothetical judge or jury, and then
decides the charge of which the defendant should be adjudged guilty.
Mitigating information, similarly, is argued not to the judge, but to the
prosecutor, who decides what sentence the defendant should be given in
exchange for his plea. If I am correct in this description of the prevailing
process, the defining characteristic of the existing "plea bargaining" system is
that it is an informal, administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication,
internal to the prosecutor's office, in absolute distinction from a model of

adversarial determination of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision
maker.
Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Bargaining:Exactly What Are We Trading OP, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-1404 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
16. For a thorough canvassing of the possibilities, see Alschuler, Alternatives, supra
note 12. The two most widely discussed alternatives are substituting jury waiver for
guilty pleas, and directly banning negotiations between prosecutors and the defense. On
the possibility of substituting adversary bench trials for negotiations between the parties,
see Stephen Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1087-89
(1984). On the possibility of prohibiting negotiations between the parties by official
policy, thereby leaving the trial penalty to judicial discretion rather than bargaining, see,
for example, Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 11, at 2003-09. For a review of the
experiments along these lines, see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/BargainingTrade-Off 55 STAN. L. REv. 29, 43-48 (2002). Wright and Miller
add to this approach the useful insight that bargaining loses value to the prosecutor when
prosecutors more vigorously screen out weak cases, and that the costs of prohibiting
bargaining depend on how prosecutors respond. If they respond by trying the same
population of files that were previously bargained, the trial rate has to go up, with
corresponding costs; but if they respond by dropping the weaker cases, the trial rate need
not rise, at least dramatically. On their account, vigorous screening might obviate the
pressure to bargain and thereby provide independent alternatives. Relative to prevailing
practice, a few more cases might go to trial, significantly more would be dropped, and the
rest would end in "open" guilty pleas. Id. at 34.
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As things stand, the prohibition of bargaining would leave
prosecutors with unregulated discretion to select charges from overbroad
and draconian criminal codes. Prohibiting bargaining would mean that
defendants could not trade their constitutional procedural entitlements off
against the state's substantive criminal law entitlements. The new model
would be one in which defendants, facing decades in prison for relatively
modest crimes, would stand trials they have little chance of winning.
The discussions on plea bargaining have the same isolated quality as
the discussions on individual bodies of criminal procedure doctrine. Of
course they matter, in some cases; but the bigger picture is the
relationship between substantive criminal law sentencing and the
procedural rights of the defendant. So serious are the difficulties that I
shall not-yet--defend any doctrinal reform on the ground that the
relation between substance and procedure would be harmonized thereby.
My task is one more modest, but I hope still useful. I aim to survey the
possible strategies by which the system might escape the current
impasse.
The possible strategies fall into five basic categories. First, we
might continue what we seem to be doing now: increasing constitutional
procedural entitlements in the hope of mitigating the excesses of the
substantive criminal law. Second, we might give up on the constitutional
distinction between substance and process by deconstitutionalizing
procedure altogether, or at least to a dramatic degree. Responsible then
for both substance and process, legislatures might strike a better balance
than is produced by the current division of labor. Third, we might
achieve the same sort of unification by constitutionalizing substance.
Robust judicial review of substantive criminal legislation might curb
overcriminalization, which might in turn lead the courts to develop a
more rational body of procedural rights. Fourth, we might look for more
rigorous restrictions on prosecutorial discretion, building on
administrative law and experience with sentencing guidelines. Fifth, we
might look for more rigorous restrictions on the defendants' right to
waive procedural rights for substantive advantage.
What I hope to add to the scholarly conversation is a brief
assessment of the promise and pitfalls that attend each of these strategies.
I.

Strategy 1: Coping and Hoping

In a remarkable statement in a remarkable opinion, the Supreme
Court of the United States declared that "given the sprawling scope of
most criminal codes, and the power to affect sentences by making (even
nonbinding) sentencing recommendations, there is already no shortage of
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in terrorem tools at prosecutors' disposal."' 7 No majority of the Court
has yet mounted a direct constitutional attack on the multiplicity or
severity of potential charges under modem penal codes.' 8 Instead, the
Court still holds fast to the substance/procedure dichotomy. The same
Court that gave us Blakely and Crawford also gave us Ewing and
Andrade.
Blakely and Crawford go beyond prior law-perhaps dramatically
beyond prior law-in their recognition of costly procedural rights for the
defense. If legislative impulses remain invisible, however, Blakely gives
us a good window on the considerations influencing the judicial aspect of
the substance/procedure game playing out with legislatures. Blakely's
open focus on the dynamics of plea bargaining to justify or criticize
doctrine not itself about the plea process appears to be novel. Legislative
motives are more plural than judicial motives, and less likely to be
recorded in detail; but it seems plausible to believe that a trade-off
motivating the court is not lost on the members of the House or Senate
judiciary committees.
Judicial considerations of course include formal constraints on
legitimate interpretation, especially on authority to invalidate legislative
enactments as unconstitutional. Much, perhaps most, of what divides
Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor in Blakely is the old tension between
understanding criminal procedure as a check on government and
understanding criminal procedure as an instrument for accurate
determination of disputed historical facts.
Both conceptions have
considerable support in text, history, and precedent.
Some of what divides the majority and the dissenters in Blakely,
however, is a technical disagreement about whether the Apprendi
doctrine will counteract or exacerbate the practical unification of
substance and process. I say the disagreement is technical because both
sides agree that the unification of substance and process is undesirable.
The disagreement centers on whether invalidating judicial factual
determinations of sentencing factors will help defendants counteract the
prosecution's advantages in plea bargaining, or whether confining
judicial sentencing discretion will increase prosecutorial power to coerce
guilty pleas.' 9 Whoever is right on this score, judicial reference to plea
17.
18.

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542.
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.

688, 703-711 (1993) (rejecting "same conduct" test of Double Jeopardy Clause's "same
offense" language).
19. Compare the Blakely majority's statement quoted supra text accompanying note
17, with Justice Breyer's dissent, to which Justice O'Connor also subscribed:
[I]n a world of statutorily fixed mandatory sentences for many crimes,
determinate sentencing gives tremendous power to prosecutors to manipulate
sentences through their choice of charges. Prosecutors can simply charge, or
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bargaining assets in formulating constitutional doctrine is now admitted
on the record.
Blakely beautifully illustrates prevailing doctrine in its pragmatic
context. In a legal ecology where quotidian criminal behavior can
plausibly support multiple charges carrying sentences that range from the
trivial to the draconian, one possible response to the concentration of
power in prosecutorial hands is to increase the value to the prosecutor of
guilty pleas by the defense. The courts can do this by insisting on costly
procedural protections with significant risks of factual error or
nullification (quintessentially the jury trial right at issue in Blakely itself).
It is no accident that the ultimate target of the Blakely majority is the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, institutional embodiments of both the
growth of federal criminal law and the expansion of executive relative to
judicial power over criminal justice.2 °
To call this approach a strategy may be an exaggeration. It is more
of a symptom than a response to the tendency of prosecutors and
defendants to find terms of trade between substance and procedure. The
Blakely majority is unequivocally clear that Blakely rights can be
waived. 2 1 Thus we may soon see sentencing schemes in which
defendants who refuse to accept fact-finding by the Court are subjected
to the prospect of dramatically heightened sentences. More likely, it
seems, is a world in which either the costs of jury-sentencing at trial, or
prosecutorial fear of judicial discretion in an indeterminate sentencing
regime, will induce prosecutors to put more pressure still on defendants
22
to plead guilty.

If the procedure/substance trade-off is a game in which courts,
representing elite opinion, have sought to reduce the severity of the
substantive law, favored by legislatures representing popular opinion, the
threaten to charge, defendants with crimes bearing higher mandatory sentences.
Defendants, knowing that they will not have a chance to argue for a lower
sentence in front of a judge, may plead to charges that they might otherwise
contest. Considering that most criminal cases do not go to trial and resolution
by plea bargaining is the norm, the rule of Apprendi, to the extent it results in a
return to determinate sentencing, threatens serious unfairness.
124 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bibas, World of Guilty Pleas, supra note
10, at 1100-01).
20. The other shoe has now dropped. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738
(2005).
21. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541 ("If appropriate waivers are procured, states may
continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead
guilty.").
22. The text was written before Booker came down. The new regime of advisory
guidelines plus appellate review of sentencing either will, or will not, lead to widespread
downward departures from the now-advisory guidelines. If we do see widespread
downward departures, we are likely to see prosecutorial bargaining of the sort described
in the text, and/or congressional intervention of some sort.
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courts have been losing the game for decades. Between 1970 and the
most recent statistics, the per capita prison population has grown almost
3 Growth continued despite the decline in crime during the
threefold.
24
1990s.
Do cases like Blakely and Crawford foreshadow a late rally, in
which the courts furnish defendants with a dramatically more generous
inventory of procedural rights? This seems as improbable as it seems
undesirable.
There are, after all, genuine doctrinal limits on
constitutionalizing defense entitlements, and this is still the Rehnquist
Court. Moreover, the bargaining value of procedural rights does not
track guilt or innocence very well.
The fundamental problem with a judicial strategy of creating
procedural entitlements to offset legislative excesses, however, is that the
courts have no reliable baseline judges can point to as the optimal
balance of advantage between the two sides in plea bargaining. An
arbitrary defense advantage would still be an arbitrary advantage. The
reason why the substance/procedure feedback loop is a problem in the
first place is its tendency to derange rational calculations about both fair
procedure and just punishment.
Absent a neutral baseline for the balance of advantage in plea
negotiations, courts can justify any procedural rule as a counter to
excessive prosecutorial leverage (just as legislators can justify any
penalty, however savage, as a prosecutorial bargaining chip rather than a
serious judgment of desert or utility). This makes any overt reliance on
plea bargaining advantages problematic for procedural purposes. The
better judicial course, in my view, is to fashion the best procedure
authoritative constraints permit, and then to protect that rational body of
23. "Bureau of Justice Statistics figures for year end 2003 indicate that there were
nearly 2.1 million inmates in the nation's prisons and jails, representing an increase of
2.6% (52,600) over the previous twelve months." The Sentencing Project, New
Incarceration Figures: Rising

Populations Despite Falling Crime Rates,

at

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf (last updated Dec. 2004). The new
figures represent a record thirty-one year continuous rise in the number of inmates in the
U.S. The current incarceration rate of 714 per 100,000 residents places the United States
first in the world in this regard. Russia had previously rivaled the U.S., but substantial
prisoner amnesty in recent years have led to a decline of the prison population, resulting
in a current rate of incarceration of 548 per 100,000. Rates of incarceration per 100,000
for other industrialized nations include Australia, 114; Canada, 116; England/Wales, 141;
France, 95; and Japan, 58. Id.
24. According to The Sentencing Report: The continued growth in incarceration
comes during a period of sustained, falling crime rates over the last decade that have led
to historic lows in crime. In addition, a number of states have implemented reforms in
sentencing and corrections policy with the intent of diverting more people from prison
and increasing the use of parole. Despite these developments, the prison and jail
population has continued to grow to unprecedented levels, with 1 in every 140 U.S.
residents incarcerated. Id.
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procedural safeguards against legislative and executive subversion via
bargaining.
If we want to achieve a world where procedure serves substance
with as little distortion as possible, we must look to new approaches.
One possible strategy, if it may be called that, is surrender: the courts
could just get out of the business of declaring constitutional rules of
procedure. This would unify substance and procedure not just in practice
but on the plane of constitutional doctrine as well.
II.

Strategy 2: Procedural Retreat

One possible response to the substance/procedure connection would
be for courts to leave legislatures in charge of both substance and
Colorable arguments support extreme pro-government
procedure.
interpretations on many issues in constitutional criminal procedure. If
the courts accepted all of these interpretations, the content of the criminal
procedure rules would be left to Congress and the states.
For instance, there is respectable authority for the claim that the
Confrontation Clause requires only that witnesses who testify at trial be
subject to cross. z5 On this reading, the Clause never operates to prohibit
proof of hearsay statements by declarants the jury never sees as
witnesses. A similar reading could permit the use of coerced confessions
by unsworn criminal defendants, who are, because unsworn, something
other than "witnesses" against themselves. Absent the exclusionary rule,
the Fourth Amendment would be a dead letter.
Pro-government reductionism, then, is plausible across many areas
of doctrine, and one could imagine successive majorities of the Supreme
Court embracing these positions. They might do so, not because
authoritative materials compel these reductionist interpretations, but
because they might conclude that the substance/procedure feedback loop
proved the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution to have been a
failure, while the authoritative legal materials do not clearly forbid the
reductionist readings.
The first obstacle to this approach is how powerful the authoritative
case against it really is. The most costly of the defendant's procedural
entitlements, from both the risk and resource points of view, is jury trial;
and jury trial could not be abolished without "burn[ing] the Sixth
Amendment., 26 The right to counsel might rival the jury trial right in
terms of cost, both direct and derivative; but Gideon enjoys unanimous
25. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(summarizing authority for this view).
26. The phrase comes from H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED
PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 311 (1996).
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support from both the left and the rightf2
Constitutional text aside, the criminal procedure revolution is now
embedded in a deep fortress of precedent.28 When change comes, the
justices who might find reductionism attractive do not always reduce in
favor of the prosecution-witness Justice Scalia's performances in
Blakely and Crawford. The judicial commitment to procedure seems
simply too deeply entrenched to offer a promising target.
The second obstacle is that judicial abdication of responsibility for
criminal procedure rules would gravely disserve procedure without
improving substance. The current scope and severity of the substantive
criminal law derives from tough-on-crime political incentives that bear
no close or direct relation to judge-made procedural rules, except to the
highly unlikely degree judicial doctrine causes crime. For example,
California adopted the three-strikes legislation long after the state's
constitution had been amended to eliminate any procedural rights for the
criminal defendant beyond those required by federal law, and during a
period when the U.S. Supreme Court was doing more for the government
than for the defense in constitutional cases.2 9
If there are reasons to doubt that pro-defendant procedural rights
caused the expansion of substantive criminal liability, there are even
stronger reasons to doubt that judicial retreat from current safeguards
would cause the repeal of duplicative or draconian legislation. The
winners from tough-on-crime legislation continue to be the law
enforcement bureaucracy, including the prison industry, and the majority
of the voting population that is either female and/or over thirty. Such
forces may on occasion make rhetorical use of court decisions, but their
incentives do not derive from legal doctrine and are unlikely to change in

27. Even those, such as Tracey Meares and myself, who are troubled (for somewhat
different reasons) about the switch from due process to the Bill of Rights that Gideon
represented, agree that indigent defendants ought to have a constitutional right to
appointed counsel. See Tracey Meares, What's Wrong With Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
215, 215 (2003) ("1 have no quarrel with Gideon's conclusion establishing the
constitutional right of indigent defendants to appointed representation."); DONALD A.
DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 116-17 (2003) [hereinafter DRIPPS, GUILT AND

INNOCENCE] ("Everyone, myself included, agrees that the constitutional right of indigent
defendants to appointed counsel announced in Gideon provides a critical safeguard
against unjust conviction, and a noble symbol of our commitment to equal justice.")
(footnote omitted).
28. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Whether or not
we would agree with Miranda'sreasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling
it now.").
29.

For an account of the political origins of the law, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET

AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3-

28 (2001).
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direct response to doctrinal changes.3 °
The losers from a judicial retreat on procedure would be innocent
suspects, who have a hard enough time vindicating themselves under the
existing set of procedural rules. Rational legislatures have little selfinterest in providing safeguards against the unjust conviction of suspects
drawn disproportionately from underclass communities. The legislative
record on this front, whether before or after the criminal procedure
revolution, reflects no such incentives.
This is not to say that some pro-government changes in the
procedural rules might not contribute to rationalizing the
substance/procedure relationship.
The more the procedural rules
promote rational adjudication (protecting the innocent without
obstructing convictions of the guilty), the more attractive limits on
defendants' waiver of those procedural rights might become. 31 The case
for limits on prosecutorial pressure to obtain waivers of innocenceprotecting procedural rights likewise might become more attractive.
III.

Strategy 3: Constitutionalizing Substance

If judicial withdrawal from the procedural front seems unpromising,
perhaps the prospects are brighter for the judicial invasion of the
substantive criminal law. Either substantive due process or the Eighth
Amendment could provide the doctrinal predicate for a more robust
judicial review of criminal law's substance. Lawrence v. Texas 32 has
emboldened libertarian speculations along these lines.33
Lawrence, however, is unlikely to support the kind of substantive
judicial review of criminal legislation that might harmonize the
substance/procedure connection. Lawrence seems far more likely to
become a case about gay rights understood as fairness to an identity
group than it is to become a case about a more general human right to be
30. On the basic incentive structure, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice: OR, Why Don't Legislatures Give a
Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYR. L. REv. 1079, 1088-95 (1993). The
possibility that Congress may show more concern about the privacy rights of the middle
class, see Orin S.Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 855-57 (2004), or the
procedural safeguards for white-collar defendants in corruption cases, see Craig S.
Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class ": Why Congress (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 628-33, does more to
reinforce than disturb the basic point.
31. For an extended argument that criminal procedure ought to take this very turn,
see DRIPPs, GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 27, at 131-73.

32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating state sodomy statute on substantive due
process grounds).
33. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 21.
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let alone.34 But that is not the strongest reason for seeking a solution to
the substance/procedure dilemma elsewhere.
Substantive due process rights insulate individual conduct from
government interference; the weight of the government's pressure to
conform matters little, if at all. But the most disturbing distortions of
both substance and process, produced by their interaction, occur in cases
in which the government has undoubted constitutional authority to
punish private conduct of the sort charged as a crime.3 5 Charges under
drug laws against simple possession, or under prostitution or gambling
laws, are themselves too minor to be brought and then dropped to induce
guilty pleas to other offenses.
On the other hand, any generalized constitutional limit on conduct
that might be made criminal poses a significant risk of undemocratic and
unwise Lochner-style limitations on legislative police powers. A wide
range of regulatory measures, including those directed at pollution and
firearms, are backed by the criminal sanction, both to deter violations
and to authorize police agencies to investigate violations. A thoroughgoing libertarianism would subject such legislation to judicial oversight
without any principled or even determinate standard of review.
The most prominent principle in the literature on limits on the
criminal law is J.S. Mill's famous harm principle. Assuming this
principle could be connected to American constitutional doctrine in a
plausible way, the concepts of harm and consent that give the principle
its content have become far more uncertain than they were in the
nineteenth century.36 Either one admits that the wage and hour law in the
Lochner case harmed no unconsenting parties and was properly struck
down, or one adopts an understanding of harm or consent so slippery that
the judges could uphold or strike laws at their whim. Neither prospect is
very attractive.
A more vigorous judicial role in limiting the penalties for conduct
that the legislature has constitutional power to define as criminal presents
a different question. If the Eighth Amendment imposed robust limits on

34.

See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1166-67

(2004) (arguing that Lawrence will not give rise to general right to be let alone).
35. The central case in the plea bargaining literature is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978). Hayes was charged with a forgery count, offered a recommendation for
a five year sentence for pleading guilty, and threatened with a recidivism charge carrying
a mandatory life sentence if he chose to go to trial. Id. at 358-59. No one defends a
constitutional right to commit forgery (or homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, theft in all
its forms, and so on). A libertarian constitutional revolution would leave the challenge of
the substance/procedure feedback loop substantially intact.
36. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, 17
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS No. 2 3, 8-11 (1998); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm
Principle,90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 118-20 (1999).
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the prison terms that may be meted out for what are conceded to be
serious offenses, prosecutors would lose some of their present power to
make functionally coercive offers. Attractive as this avenue appears
initially, on closer inspection it turns out to be blocked by at least two
serious obstacles.
The present Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence is
extraordinarily deferential to legislative choice.37 Time works changes
on the Court, however, with or without changes in personnel. In the
Ewing case four justices joined Justice Steven's dissenting opinion
advocating a general proportionality limit on prison sentences. To the
extent that draconian sentences for minor crimes enable prosecutors to
terrorize defendants into pleading guilty, the case for a robust
proportionality test is strengthened. Penalties imposed on only a small
minority of similar offenders are obviously not required by retributive
justice. From a utilitarian perspective one can imagine reasons for
imposing very heavy penalties on a few offenders for lottery-like
reasons, 38 but the empirical evidence suggests that it is certainty, rather
than severity, that deters.39
Proportionality review, however, contributes only partially to
rationalizing the substance/procedure relationship. Many felony suspects
are arrested under circumstances including the commission of multiple
criminal offenses. For instance, a defendant charged with robbery at a
poker game is guilty of robbing each of the victims. 40 The single
transaction thus supports multiple charges, inviting the prosecutor to
charge multiple counts with potentially consecutive sentences, each of
which would withstand even vigorous proportionality review.
A more restrictive compulsory joinder rule, whether constitutional
or statutory, might respond to this possibility. Such a move might also
be justified as a free-standing reduction in the severity of the criminal
code. If Grady v. Corbin's transactional interpretation of doublejeopardy returned, prosecutors would have to bundle all charges based on
the same incident into a single proceeding. 4 1 But even Grady's return
would not deny prosecutors great power over the potential sentence,
37. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 37475.
38. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 961, 1299 (2001).
39. See, e.g., Bibas, Outside the Shadow, supra note 11, at 2510 n.195 (reviewing
studies).
40. The scenario is drawn from Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 (1970).
41. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (adopting a "same offense" test
which barred subsequent prosecution for an offense whose elements included conduct for
which the defendant have previously been prosecuted). The Court overruled Grady in
Dixon and Foster, 509 U.S. at 703-711.
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because Grady only limited the timing, not the number, of offenses that
might be charged.
A more overtly substantive doctrine would require the prosecution
to bring only a single charge out of any common nucleus of operative
fact, or to prohibit the imposition of consecutive sentences. This would
prevent prosecutors from exploiting the authority to seek consecutive
sentences, but it seems impossible to justify on double-jeopardy grounds
and dubious as a policy matter. Homicides or robberies involving
multiple victims pose the decisive counter-example.
Many felony suspects also have records of conviction for prior
serious offenses. Where recidivism laws permit the prosecution, in one
way or another, to add or subtract a recidivism count, they give the
prosecutor formidable leverage indeed. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a life sentence for a recidivism
conviction after the defense had rejected the state's offer to recommend a
five year sentence if the defendant pleaded guilty to the instant offense.42
So long as very long prison terms are permitted for repeat players, the
government will have the opportunity to convert a substantive threat into
the waiver of procedural safeguards.
If we are to come to grips with the substance/procedure interface,
we will need to look to the two remaining possible strategies: crafting
limits, whether constitutional, statutory, or customary, on either the
discretion of prosecutors to bring substantive charges; or the discretion of
defendants to waive procedural rights.
IV.

Strategy 4: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion

Hypothesize an ideal set of criminal procedure rights held by
defendants, using your own favored criteria (originalist, dignitary,
instrumental, or what you will). The thought experiment includes only
one limit on your power to alter legal doctrine: you may not modify
defendants' rights to waive whatever procedural rights you select. Now
project this ideal set of procedural rules into the otherwise real world of
overbroad and overly harsh substantive legislation and limited systemic
resources. In this scenario, we want prosecutors to exercise discretion to
reduce the excessiveness of the theoretical statutory maximum, without
circumventing the ideal procedural rules by threatening defendants with
penalties that in the prosecutor's best judgment are excessive from a
substantive point of view.
I don't mean "we" in the sense of public-spirited academics; I mean
we in the sense of a supermajority of the polity that is stable across time.

42,

See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 357.
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Legislatures could provide that the statutory maxima are mandatory.
They can't force the executive to bring charges, but legislatures easily
require very harsh penalties for any offense, forcing prosecutors to either
decline prosecution or impose the harsh sentence. Instead, in a
consistent pattern, legislatures continually create new offenses, and
ratchet up the theoretical maximum penalty for existing ones, knowing
that these provisions will be applied in a discriminating way by
prosecutors.
The analogy to legislative delegations of other difficult public
policy problems to administrative agencies is illuminating. Faced with
difficult trade-offs between costs and benefits, whether in entitlement or
regulatory programs, legislatures typically adopt statutory language to
the effect of "do good and avoid evil" and leave the unpopular details to
an appointed agency.43 Thus Congress declares that OSHA shall
guarantee worker safety "to the extent feasible,"" or that the FCC shall
regulate the airwaves "in the public interest. 4 5 So too in criminal
justice, legislatures simply declare crime to be bad, authorize an
enormous range of discretionary outcomes, and leave the difficult and
politically controversial judgments to prosecutors.
Given this basic framework, two variations on the basic strategy of
regulating prosecutorial discretion suggest themselves. The first is to try
to protect the procedural rules directly, by putting an explicit limit on the
additional penalties that may be imposed on defendants because they
refuse to waive their procedural rights. The second is to admit, but
regulate, prosecutorial primacy in criminal justice, just as we admit but
regulate administrative primacy in environmental law. Neither strategy
is at all hopeless.
There seems to be wide agreement that offenders who admit
responsibility for their crimes deserve some reduction in their penalty.
Compared to defiance or denial, repentance suggests a less bad character,
more capacity for making hard choices rightly, and a reduced danger to
the community. Thus, imposing a higher penalty on those who plead
43.

See Lowi Theodore J., THE

END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE

92-126 (2d ed. 1979). Debate about the nondelegation doctrine revolves
around the justifiability, rather than the ubiquity, of this legislative practice.
UNITED STATES

44. See Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Congress "could have required the Secretary to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis prior to the setting of exposure levels, it could have prohibited cost-benefit
analysis, or it could have permitted the use of such an analysis. Rather than make that
choice and resolve that difficult policy issue, however, Congress passed. Congress simply
said that the Secretary should set standards 'to the extent feasible'.").
45. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) ("The
touchstone provided by Congress was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity,' a
criterion which 'is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit."') (citations omitted).
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guilty is not wrong on principle. The question is when the trial penalty
becomes excessive.
The first challenge in any such inquiry is figuring out just what the
trial penalty actually is. 46 To do this we need to know what part of a
prosecutor's charge reflects a judgment about the ideal punishment for
the particular offender on the instant occasion, and what part reflects a
threat to encourage a plea. This is not easy to ascertain. "For just as a
prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to
save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional
charges if an initial expectation that
a defendant would plead guilty to
47
lesser charges proves unfounded.,
The assessment is difficult, but perhaps not impossible. Suppose
the rules required the prosecutor to file charges that were nonnegotiable;
the defendant could plead to those charges but not others. In this sort of
system, new charges could not be added to the original ones. The
defendant could take the prosecution's offer or leave it in favor of trial,
subject to a significant but not in terrorem trial penalty, set as a
percentage of the sentence due on conviction.
There would still be the opportunity for negotiating before charges
are filed. In many cases, however, the investigative process puts a short
fuse on when charges must be brought, and that fuse could be made
shorter by appropriate doctrinal changes. Moreover, if the trial penalty
were properly set, prosecutors might not feel the need to bargain before
charging. They might do so to turn a potential informant, but they would
not need to do so to encourage pleas.
Absent bargaining, the prosecutor's ideal number of trials is not
zero, and the defendant's ideal number of trials is not one hundred
46. See Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 1993 n.52:
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has estimated that in the federal system, preguidelines, the average difference between guilty plea sentences and those
imposed after trial was 25-35%. [citation omitted] In some state courts,
posttrial sentences can be two to four times higher than sentences imposed after
a plea in a comparable case. See, Thomas M. Uhlman & Darlene N. Walker,
"He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His": An Analysis of Judicial
Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & So'Y REv. 323, 328 (1980) (in
large Eastern city, controlling for prior record and seriousness of charge,
average sentence after jury trial was nearly three times more severe than
average guilty plea sentence). An important qualification, however, is that
"bargains" in many jurisdictions prove to be illusory, especially when judges
use the low-visibility practice of "real-offense" sentencing to offset
prosecutorial concessions.
Where this practice still exists, posttrial and
bargained sentences tend to converge. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due
Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 757 (1980); H. Joo Shin, Do
Lesser PleasPay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole Processes, I
J. CRIM. JUST. 27, 34-35 (1973).
47. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 379 (1982) (footnote omitted).

2005]

OVERCRIMINALIZATION, DISCRETION, WAIVER

1173

percent. One of the reasons lawyers work in prosecutor's offices (and
public defender's offices) is to gain trial experience. In a few cases the
government really is interested, for legitimate policy reasons, in maxing
the defendant out. In a no-questions asked or given dispute (a death case
would be the paradigm example), the government of course expects a
trial. Defendants who delay a highly-probable conviction lose time with
a cloud over their heads (and may be in pretrial detention as well).
Those paying private counsel face a monetary trial penalty as well.
Professor Givelber's version of this strategy is to somehow screen
defense decisions to go to trial and protect the nonfrivolous ones from
any enhanced penalty. 48 The suggestion here is that a trial penalty might
be a better way to screen defense cases for trial. Rather than ask some
sort of review panel (or a sentencing court) to pass on the good faith of a
defendant's assessment of his trial chances, a significant trial penalty
might force defendants to do the screening themselves. Trial screening
that incorporates existing resource constraints would likely replicate plea
bargaining outcomes; trial screening that did not reflect resource
constraints might bankrupt the system.
Setting the trial penalty poses another difficult problem. The trial
penalty cannot be monetized; defendants with the means to hire private
counsel already face such a monetary incentive, while the majority of
defendants represented by publicly-funded counsel are judgment-proof
or close to it. We might, however, imagine an auction system, in which
the legislature provides funds for a fixed number of trials, and defendants
bid against each other according to how high a trial penalty they stand
ready to serve if they win the auction but lose the trial. The more serious
the penalty for the offense, and the greater the age of the accused, the
quicker the trial penalty would become cumulative with the offense
penalty; a fifty year old defendant facing a fifty year offense penalty
could freely accept a hundred year trial penalty, while a twenty year old
defendant facing a ten year offense penalty would have to be virtually
certain of acquittal to do the same. Many might also have paternalistic
objections to permitting irrational defendants to mortgage their lives for
trials that appear highly likely to end in convictions.
If defendants act rationally, a trial penalty far smaller than
prosecutors may threaten at present would suffice to discourage frivolous
trials. If one were to design an experiment, we might start with this
model. First, no defendant should be incarcerated solely as a trial
penalty. The coercive effects of the binary in/out alternatives are very
strong. A defendant may be inappropriately incarcerated for going to
48. Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestationsof Innocence: Denying Responsibility
andIts Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1363 (2000).
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trial, while some other defendant could get a slap on the wrist because
the prosecutor's office is too concerned about its conviction rate.
Second, any defendant convicted after rejecting the prosecution's initial
offer would be sentenced to a penalty set as a percentage of the otherwise
applicable sentence, whether measured in dollars in fines, periods of
supervision, or time in prison.
There should, however, be a fixed limit on how much time in prison
an individual should do for going to trial. The shocking thing about
Bordenkircher is not the existence of a trial penalty but the coercive size
of that penalty. We would be better off than at present if we accepted a
high percentage trial penalty (say, 100%) but capped the trial penalty at
ten years in prison. Khafkaesque as that sounds, it's a step up from
Bordenkircher.49
This arrangement would eliminate much of the prosecution's
current arbitrary power, while still giving defendants with weak cases
good reasons to plead. Those who insist on a higher trial penalty are
trusting prosecutors not to exploit the power they certainly have, and on
diverting resources from trials in close criminal cases to other uses (some
worthy and some not-so-worthy). Those who resist a modest trial
penalty are inviting defendants to spend public money without any selfscrutiny of their cases' strength or weakness. Difficult as identifying the
baseline charge and the appropriate trial penalty may be, the pursuit of
their approximations may be a better course than what we are doing now.
The alternative substrategy for regulating prosecutorial discretion
forgoes any rigid limits on either the prosecution's baseline assessment
of the offender's culpability or the appropriate trial penalty. Instead, this
approach to regulating prosecutorial discretion looks to administrative
law, where agencies entrusted with vast discretion are checked by
procedural requirements of transparency and accountability.5
Prosecutors would need to develop guidelines for their exercise of
discretionary power, and those guidelines in particular cases would be
reviewable either by a body of supervisory government lawyers or by
courts.
The predictable claim that executive charging authority must be
49. The problem of regulating the trial penalty in potentially capital cases is
sufficiently distinctive that I here express no view on the best approach.
50. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 2117 (1998) (describing system as prosecutor-centered administrative
law system; rejecting whole-sale administrative law model because pretense of legislative
primacy serves useful functions and because cost of APA type procedures would be
excessive; but commending a right to be heard regarding prosecutorial charging
decisions). Cf Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 515 (2000) (arguing for administrative-law rulemaking approach to regulate
discretionary enforcement by police of overbroad penal codes).
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plenary as a constitutional separation of powers matter would be
subordinated to individual constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection. Current law rightly recognizes that executive power to select
factually supportable criminal charges does not override the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. 51 The same should hold for
procedural due process.
If in fact the key decisions about the defendant's liberty are made by
prosecutors, rather than by legislators and courts, then it makes sense to
admit this openly as a matter of constitutional doctrine. The defendant,
on this account, would have an administrative due process liberty interest
in freedom from the filing of charges. Due process, of course, requires
trial to protect the factually innocent; but it might also require a right to
be heard, according to general criteria, and a right to review, to protect
individuals against the arbitrary exercise of the discretionary power to
bring greater rather than lesser charges, when both greater and lesser can
be justified on the facts. This turn would admit prosecutorial power but
subject it to procedural safeguards.5 3 Put in a nutshell, the argument is
51. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-465:
Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is "subject to constitutional constraints."
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).
One of these
constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), is
that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on "an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 (1962). A defendant may demonstrate
that the administration of a criminal law is "directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons... with a mind so unequal and oppressive" that the
system of prosecution amounts to "a practical denial" of equal protection of the
law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
52. Judge Lynch quite rightly argues that regulating prosecutorial practices should
not be regarded as displacing the defendant's right to insist on an adversary trial. See
Lynch, supra note 50, at 2144-45. I suspect that administrative law type regulation of
prosecutorial decision-making would actually strengthen the trial option, by reducing the
ability of prosecutors to penalize resort to it. At any rate, recognizing a right to be heard
with respect to prosecutorial charging decisions, an idea Judge Lynch certainly seem
receptive to, would not in any way undermine the various trial rights written into the
constitutional text. Id.
On the larger point of whether the prosecutor's office should morph in the direction
of an administrative agency sua sponte or under judicial compulsion, there is no reason
why this choice should be treated as binary. The more prosecutors' offices formalize
procedures or formulate criteria to guide charging decisions, the more these will come to
look like legal entitlements protected by procedural due process. Some judicial
intervention might speed the process along considerably. All I suggest here is that we
need not accept the current assumption that because prosecutorial discretion exists it must
also exist in arbitrary form.
53. See Lynch, supra note 50, at 2145. As to the considerations of cost and
simplicity Judge Lynch points out they are important, but taken into account by the test of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). Id. If suspension from public school is
serious enough to call for at least notice and an opportunity to be heard, see Goss v.
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that if due process prohibits entrusting the cancellation of retirement
benefits by the Social Security Administration absent a hearing applying
public criteria, due process certainly prohibits entrusting the infliction of
decades behind bars to a single junior functionary making an
unreviewable and secret decision according to secret (or no) criteria.
Ironically, a right to be heard by the prosecutor would be
inconsistent with the prohibition of plea discussions.
From the
perspective of procedural due process, prohibiting citizen input on a
decision that clearly has major life consequences for the individual is
wrong on principle. The choice between attacking plea bargaining by
standardizing the trial penalty and prohibiting negotiations, or by
subjecting prosecutorial discretion to procedural safeguards, really is a
fork in the road.
Both Sentencing Guidelines schemes in every form, and
prosecutorial policies of the sort discussed by Ron Wright in this
symposium, suggest the feasibility of regulating criminal justice
discretion according to general criteria. Sentencing guidelines may be
unwise, and prosecutorial policies may be unusual. If the issue is the
possibility of regulating discretion according to general standards,
however, these examples are powerful evidence of feasibility.
The objection that public and enforceable criteria for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion would enable violation of some laws seems to
me a strong point in favor of such an approach. People have a right to
know the law, and if the real law is made by prosecutors, then people
have a right to know which criminal statutes the legislature has
authorized prosecutors to nullify. Legislators know very well that
prosecutors ameliorate the law in practice; the more opaque and
standardless the process by which this amelioration occurs, the more it
favors the privileged over the disempowered.
V.

Strategy 5: Limiting Waiver

The final possible strategy surveyed here is to limit the defendant's
right to waive procedural safeguards. Defendants at present may not
waive a determination of competency to stand trial and every effort is

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975), we should be able to devise an affordable procedure
that requires some input from the defense before the prosecutor's discretionary charging
decision becomes final. How much procedure is an important and difficult question. We
should remember, however, that the criminal defendant will have counsel, and the present
plea bargaining regime of course involves discussions between defense counsel and
prosecutors. Discovery, as Judge Lynch points out, is a vital aid to defense lawyers
seeking to persuade a prosecutor. Lynch, supra note 50, at 2147-49. If discussions are
going to happen anyway, they might as well happen a little later and with a lot more
information
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made to discourage the waiver of counsel. Before pleading guilty the
defendant must be advised of the charges, his right to trial by jury, his
right to confront adverse witnesses, and the range of possible penalties he
subjects himself to by plea.54 Everything else can be waived, and usually
is.

The simplest doctrinal move in the direction of limiting waiver
rights is to prohibit the entry of a pleas or plea discussions until the
adversary process has advanced further toward trial. Suppose, for
instance, that the defendant could not plead guilty until after an
adversarial probable cause hearing. A preliminary hearing does not
eliminate plea bargaining, but it does defer bargaining until the defense
has heard the prosecution's case, at least in outline form.
The more of the litigation process that takes place before accepting
a plea, the smaller the marginal cost of trial. Trial de novo systems work
this way: if convicted by the court, the defendant may up the ante by
seeking a new trial, this time by jury, in the felony court.55 If the
defendant could not waive the initial part of the process, the bulk of
defendants who ultimately plead would have the benefit of much greater
scrutiny of their particular cases. The costs of criminal litigation would
increase accordingly, unless the number of trials went down at the same
time. That seems unlikely; the point to a hearing requirement would be
to expose weaknesses in the state's case that might otherwise go
unnoticed. Few defendants who now refuse to plead would be convinced
to do so by a preliminary hearing; the likely effect would be to enable
defense counsel to persuade prosecutors to make concessions, or to
increase the frequency of trials on balance.
A more radical approach would permit the defendant to waive his
right to waive his rights, a la Ulysses and the sirens.56 If we are

54. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754-55:
The standards to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that
defined by Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises
that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes). (footnote omitted).
55. The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to such systems in Colten
v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 105 (1972).
56. For the story, see HOMER'S ODYSSEY book XII. On the rationality of
precommitment strategies, see, e.g., ELSTER JON, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); SCHELLING THOMAS C.,
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE: PERSPECTIVES OF AN ERRANT ECONOMIST ch. 4 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1984).
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interested in counterbalancing the prosecution's bargaining leverage, we
might make an analogy to the traditional case for trade unions.
Employers cannot fire all their workers, but the threat to fire a particular
individual is perfectly credible and powerfully coercive. Enter trade
unions: the employer cannot afford to replace all of the employees at
once, and so employees gain collectively greater leverage than they can
exert individually.
The government can afford to try any given case and hammer the
defendant who insisted on that one trial. But there are not enough
judicial or prosecutorial resources to try every defendant (that, after all,
is the strongest point in favor of plea bargaining). Nor is there enough
prison space to max out every defendant. If defendants could coordinate
their bargaining positions there would be a major power shift in
bargaining power.57
This might be done in different ways, but here is the most direct
(and the most radical). What if we took the plea-bargain-as-contract idea
further than ever, and said that defendants may enter into legally
enforceable covenants not to compete, i.e., not to plead except on terms
acceptable to all members of the agreement? In the strong version of this
proposal, there need be no factual connection between the cases; they
need only be pending at the same time when the agreement is made.
The prosecution might try and encourage cheating on these
agreements by entering into deals whereby defendants forced to stand
trial by the covenant put on no defense in exchange for sentencing
advantages. But there would still have to be a trial, and the cost of
assembling the jury and presenting the case would still have to be paid.
Moreover, defendants seeking true precommitment could agree in
advance to joint counsel representing all members of the cartel. Such a
lawyer would be ethically obliged to fight the prosecution's case on
behalf of cartel members not on trial. The defendant's right to take the
stand and confess might also be something that could be assigned, by
contract, to the group.
At some point, too many defendants in an agreement would doom
all to trial because agreement would be impossible. Larger groups would
have to adopt some sort of majority rule concept, which poses difficult
duty-of-loyalty problems. Small groups could manage the unanimity
requirement. If a number must be suggested, we might look to the jury
and start with covenants not to exceed twelve members.
The idea sounds unthinkable, but it is simply the mirror image of
57.

Defense lawyers on occasion have organized mass refusals to plead out, with

some albeit not unqualified success. See Albert W.

Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1249-53 (1975).
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plea bargaining. At present defendants waive procedural rights to avoid
higher penalties for their crimes. Why shouldn't they have the right to
waive their individual rights to plea bargain, in exchange for what they
rationally anticipate to be higher concessions for the ultimate joint
decision to waive? The answer can't be that they don't own their
procedural rights or can't alienate them for advantage, for these are the
very premises on which plea bargaining depends. If The Brotherhood of
Criminal Defendants Local 116 is unthinkable, it is not because it would
create a market for guilty pleas; we already have that. If The
Brotherhood is unthinkable, it must be because it would create a market
for guilty pleas in which the terms of trade are not to our liking.
VI.

Conclusion

The risk that discretionary applications of criminal law's substance
to obtain waivers of procedural rights will distort both substance and
procedure seems very great. Indeed, that risk is realized on an everyday
basis. This paper has sought to survey the possible responses to the often
perverse relationship of substance and procedure. None of the plausible
responses is sure to succeed; all have risks, and most cannot exclude the
possibility of demanding additional resources for criminal justice relative
to other pressing public needs. Reasonable people may adhere to the
status quo as the least of evils. For my part I would hope that the
scholarly conversation I've sought to frame leads to the formulation of at
least one strategy that calls into question the sophistication of despair.

